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Abstract In this paper we consider game theoretic models of control on net-
works with application to marketing. We suppose that all strong subgroups
are determined in the stage of analysis of the inuence digraph, and the
control impact is exerted only to the members of those subgroups because
they determine all stable nal opinions. An agent's opinion is interpreted as
his expenses for buying goods (services) of a rm. The following problem of
opinion control is being studied. A dynamic (dierence) game in normal form
where the players solve the problem of maximization of the sum of opinions
of the members of a target audience by means of the closed-loop strategies
of impact to the current opinions of the members of strong subgroups. We
received the analytical solutions and conducted their comparative analysis.
Keywords: games in normal form, models of impact and control on net-
works, marketing.
1. Introduction
A basic model of inuence in a social group was rst considered in (French, 1956),
(Harary, 1959) and studied in more details in (De Groot, 1974). Then many gen-
eralizations and renements of this model were considered: dynamic interactions,
conditions of convergence, speed of convergence, conditions of uniqueness of the nal
opinion, and so on (De Marzo et al., 2003), (Golub and Jackson, 2010), (Hegselman
and Krause, 2002). One of the most detailed monographs on network modeling is
(Jackson, 2008); see also (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996). An application of the net-
work models to the analysis of political processes is described in the monograph
(Aleskerov et al., 2007). The issues of communication and coordination in social
networks are analyzed in (Chwe, 2000). The (Godes D., Mayzlin, 2004), (Golden-
berg et al., 2001) are concerned with the "word of mouth". A detailed analysis of the
models of inuence in networks is presented in (Gubanov, 2011), (Chkhartishvili et
al., 2019).
Together with models of inuence, the models of control in social groups with
given structure of interactions are of even more interests (Chkhartishvili et al., 2019).
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In turn, it is natural here to dierentiate the models of optimal control (the only con-
trol agent) and the models of conict control (several interacting control agents with
dierent interests). A mathematical formalization of the latter models generates
game theoretic setups on networks (Novikov, 2014), (Jackson and Zenou, 2014).
The dierential game theoretic models in marketing are presented in the mono-
graph (Jorgensen and Zaccour, 2004) and review (Jorgensen and Zaccour, 2014).
In this paper we investigate an opinion control problem with application to
marketing. This is a dynamic (dierence) game in normal form, where the players
maximize the sum of opinions of the members of a target audience by the closed-loop
strategies of impact to the current opinions of the members of strong subgroups.
The analytical solutions are received, and their comparative analysis is made.
Lagrange multipliers method is used to nd players' strategies. This method is
used at each step of the iterative procedure for a control impact of the i-th rm to
the j-th agent in the t-th period of time.
2. The principal information
The basic model of inuence in a social network is a weighted directed graph
in which the vertices correspond to the members of the social group (agents), and
the arcs describe their mutual interaction. Each vertex is ascribed a real value (an
opinion of the member of the group) that can change in time, and each arc is
ascribed another real value (a weight) that characterizes a degree of inuence of
one agent to another (or, that is the same, a degree of trust of the latter agent to
the former one).
Thus, a network is modeled by a digraph D = (Y,A), where Y = {y1, . . . , yn}
is a set of agents (vertices); yi → xi(t), i = 1, . . . , n  the agent's opinion; x0 =
(x01, . . . , x
0
n)  a vector of initial opinions of the agents; aij  a coecient of inuence
of the i-th agent to the opinion of the j-th agent; A = ∥aij∥  a matrix of inuences









j = xj0, j = 1, . . . , n. (1)
In (Roberts, 1976) it is shown that all members of each i-th strong subgroup (a
nondegenerated strong component of the network that belongs to the vertex base












k  a component of the stationary vector for the Markov chain with the
transition matrix ATi , ni  a number of members of the i-th strong subgroup. The
nal opinions of other agents that do not belong to any strong subgroup ("compan-







where bji  a probability of transition of the agent j to the strong subgroup i as an
ergodic set of states of the Markov chain, r  a total number of strong subgroups
in the digraph of inuences.
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Consider an application of the models of inuence and control on net-works to
marketing. Our approach is presented in (Agieva et al., 2019), (Korolev and Ougol-
nitsky, 2020), (Agieva et al., 2020). There are m rms that are capable to exert
inuence to a target audience for the change of its opinion to the desirable direc-
tion. At least one of the rms realizes marketing actions that are considered as an
impact to the opinions of the target audience. The pay-o of each rm consists
in the increase of the opinions. An agent's opinion is treated as the total costs of
buying goods (services) of a rm - one of the agents of conict control.
Let us study dierent game theoretic control problems setups. It is assumed that
the strong subgroups are already found, and only the members of strong subgroups
are inuenced. Let us illustrate the solutions on the following test example (Fig.1).
Fig. 1. A test example. The market consists of 9 buyers (agents). Their eects on each
other are shown by arrows. There are two strong subgroups (i = 1, 2). There are two rms
(k = 1, 2) that exert a control inuence on the opinions of buyers. The control eect of
the k-th rm on the j-th member of the i-th strong subgroup is denoted by ui,kj
3. Dynamic model
The of impact in this model is to maximize the sum of opinions of the members of
target audience for the whole period from t = 1 till t = n. The impact in closed-loop
strategies is exerted on the current opinions of the members of strong subgroups.
3.1. Independent behavior of the players





























































 a control impact of the i-th rm to the j-th agent in the t-th
period of time. This value is positive if the j-th agent enters into one of the strong







= 0. The total (by all strong subgroups of the network)
number of agents impacted by the i-th rm is denoted by mi.
It is more convenient to describe the problem setup and its solution in a matrix













, t = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1, X1 = X,
























 a sum of the control impacts of
the i-th rm in the t-th period. The matrix B consists of m blocks that is number of
rms. Each block Bi describes impacts of the i-th rm and has dimension N ×mi,
i.e. its number of rows is equal to the number of agents in the network, and the
number of columns is equal to the total number of members of the strong subgroups
that are impacted. The respective element of the matrix B is equal to one if the
impact holds, and to zero, otherwise. X  a column vector of the values of state
variables, u  a column vector of the control impacts of the rms, ε  a row vector
from units of the length N , δ denotes a discount factor, i.e. δ = e−ρ.
Consider a one-step game (the recursion base).The i-th rm maximizes the func-
tion
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for any agents j1 and j2 that are impacted by the i-th rm. Substituting (5) in (4),












AT (X +Bu) +Bu∗
]}
→ max,
















for any agents j1 and j2 that are impacted by the i-th rm, where Aj denotes the
sum of elements of the j-th row of the inuence matrix A. Substitution of (7) to

































where u∗  the solution of the one-step game, u∗∗  the solution of the two-step
game. The same actions as in the two-step case give the relations
1 + δAj1 + δ
2A2j1








for any agents j1 and j2 that are impacted by the i-th rm, where A
2
j denotes the
sum of elements of the j-th row of the square of the inuence matrix. In general,
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denote by Asj the sum of elements of the j-th row of the s-th power of the matrix A.





(1 + δAk + δ2A2k)
p
p−1















2A2j+· · ·+δn−1An−1j )
1
p−1 .
The summing by k in the denominator is made by all agents of strong subgroups
that are impacted by the i-th rm.
Let us write down the payo of each rm. If any rm does not exert impact to
any agent, the payo is equal to
ε
[











If at least one rm impacts to a set of agents from the strong subgroups then the
payo of each rm increases. Let us calculate it sequentially. If in the rst period
































































































k=1 means that the summing is made by all agents
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impacted by the i-th rm. Similarly, in the second period the i-th rm solves (n−1)-



















and so on. In the q-th period of time the i-th rm solves (n−q+1)-step optimization



















In the (n − 2)-th period of time the i-th rm solves the three-step optimization



















In the (n − 1)-th period of time the i-th rm solves the two-step optimization


















In the n-th period of time the i-th rm solves the one-step optimization problem,













Now it stays to allocate the budget between the time periods from the 1-st till





































































i = Ri. (11)
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where 1 ≤ q1, q2 ≤ n. Expressing the budgets of all periods by the rst-period


































































The substitution of the expression (12) in the formula (10) gives a nal payo of












































































Summing the payos of each rm from the eorts of the i-th rm in control of the

































































Summing the control eorts of all rms, we receive the payo of each i-th rm
ε
[





































Respectively, the total payo of all rms is equal to
ε
[







































3.2. Cooperative behavior of the players
There are N agents and m rms. A control body in the name of all rms solves

































































is the value of impact of the i-th rm on the j-th agent in the t-th
period of time. This value is positive if the j-th agent enters into one of the strong







= 0. Denote mi total number of agents im-pacted by the
i-th rm.
The cooperative solution is technically the same as in the case of independent
players, so we give at once the received evident result.
The total payo is equal to
ε
[






































































































































According the Holder inequality, if p > 1 and 1p +
1




































































Thus, from the point of view of the total payo the cooperation is more advan-
tageous than competition when the control cost is big, and vice versa, when the
control cost is small.
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4. Conclusion
In this paper we consider game theoretic models of control on networks with
application to marketing. We suppose that all strong subgroups are determined in
the stage of analysis of the inuence digraph, and the control impact is exerted only
to the members of those subgroups because they determine all stable nal opinions.
An agent's opinion is interpreted as his expenses for buying goods (services) of a
rm. The following problem of opinion control is studied. problems of the opinions
control on networks are studied. A dynamic (dierence) game in normal form where
the players solve the problem of maximization of the sum of opinions of the members
of a target audience by means of the closed-loop strategies of impact to the current
opinions of the members of strong subgroups. We received the analytical solutions
and conducted their comparative analysis.
The following directions of the further research are seemed to be interesting:
- analysis of the Stackelberg games on networks that reect a hierarchy in mar-
keting channels;
- analysis of the dynamic games in the form of characteristic function that model
the cooperation of players and the ways of allocation of the received income;
- development of the methods of identication of the game theoretic models in
specic applications.
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